Shirkou Bahadori; Teymour Mohammadi; Farshad Momeni; Abbas Kazeminajafabadi
Abstract
In this study the effect of petroleum contracts on Iran and Saudi Arabia’s oil production trend has investigated. Disaggregated approach has utilized to investigate the effect of petroleum contracts. In this approach, optimal production of the fields of above mentioned countries, has been evaluated ...
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In this study the effect of petroleum contracts on Iran and Saudi Arabia’s oil production trend has investigated. Disaggregated approach has utilized to investigate the effect of petroleum contracts. In this approach, optimal production of the fields of above mentioned countries, has been evaluated in two scenarios. Then by summation of production data of all fields, production trend of these two countries has been calculated. In the first scenario, it is assumed that control of oil production is in the hands of host country, while control of production in the second scenario is determined based on the kind of contracts which the host country has had during its oil production history. Based on the estimated production trend of two countries, it is observed that in the case which International Oil Company controls the production, rate of oil extraction is more than the case which production is controlled by the host country. Also by increasing the portion of International Oil Company from the produced oil, it increases the production rate to maximize its own net present value.
Amir JAfarzadeh; Abbas Shakeri; Farshad Momeni; Ghahreman Abdoli
Volume 3, Issue 12 , October 2014, , Pages 144-177
Abstract
Following paper explores Iran & Turkmenistan's behavior in exporting natural gas to Europe. Taking this matter these two countries can be a potential of gas exporter to Europe. By using a framework of cooperative game theory, coalition among natural gas exporters and transmitters for the Nabucco ...
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Following paper explores Iran & Turkmenistan's behavior in exporting natural gas to Europe. Taking this matter these two countries can be a potential of gas exporter to Europe. By using a framework of cooperative game theory, coalition among natural gas exporters and transmitters for the Nabucco Project has been explored. In this paper we answer the question whether the two countries should go to the coalition for exporting gas to Europe or not. Moreover, we calculate bargaining power of these two countries. By having outcomes of following paper one can conclude that the both countries have profits to make the coalition for gas exporting among the Nabucoo project. Iran has more bargaining power than Turkmenistan so Iran can play important and active role to make a coalition to export gas to Europe among the Nabucco project.
